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Introduction 
 
The phenomena – or, more precisely, the discourse - of ‘terrorism’ has increasingly come to 
dominate contemporary international politics. From the alliance building of states waging a 
‘global war on terror’ to their domestic measures combating ‘terrorism financing’ or even 
curbing the ‘glorification of terrorism,’1 a myriad of terrorism-related techniques, 
technologies and strategies have evolved in recent times. Whilst these trends have inevitably 
intensified since the deadly attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, they have 
long been emerging, particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union, after which global 
liberalism became a strategic project pursued by powerful Western states and their associated 
institutions and organisations2. Much disputed but now quite unavoidable, the concept of 
‘terrorism’ has thus led to a plethora of new power relations which redefine the fields of 
possibilities for a range of actors around the world, including states, NGOs, business, media, 
political entities, individuals, both citizen or immigrant, and, of course, armed non-state 
actors. These ever expanding and diffuse relations of power are producing new subjectivities, 
new forms of domination and, inevitably, new forms of resistance. 
 
This chapter is an exploration of this phenomenon as it impacts on the question of Tamil self-
determination as, played out in relationships between the Tamil diaspora and Western host 
states. In particular, it examines the consequences of the designation of the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Elam (LTTE), an armed opposition movement that many Tamils consider to be an 
authentic expression of resistance to oppression by the Sinhala-dominated Sri Lankan state, 
as a terrorist organization, a process that has intensified since the beginning of the war on 
terror. The implications of this designation and the conflicting ideas of legitimacy and 
resistance that it calls into play are well exemplified by Figure 1, which shows opposing 
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demonstrations by expatriate Tamils and Sinhalese that took place on June 10, 2008 outside 
the Commonwealth Secretariat in London Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa was 
meeting other leaders. The Tamils, protesting ’60 years of oppression’ demonstrated in 
support of self determination while the members of the Sinhala community challenged the 
legitimacy of this demand. While the nature of relationships between Western states, the 
Tamil diaspora and the politics of proscription is considerably more complex than is 
suggested by this picture, it captures some of the contradictions in the British state’s approach 
to Sri Lanka’s conflict: whilst the UK deems the LTTE a terrorist organisation using violence 
against a multi-cultural democracy, British police erect barricades to separate the polarised 
Tamil and Sinhala communities. 
 
 
Figure 1: Opposing demonstrations by expatriate Tamils and Sinhalese outside the Commonwealth 
Secreterait in London, 10 June 2008. Photograph by Suthaharan Nadarajah 
 
The concept of terrorism has impacted in innumerable ways on the lives of large numbers of 
ordinary people around the world and, especially, on the activities, strategies and identities of 
countless entities engaged in politics, broadly defined. This is despite manifest disagreement 
on what actually constitutes ‘terrorism’. The determined efforts of numerous scholars, 
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research centres and institutions, not least the United Nations, are yet to produce a consensus 
and even the impatient insistence of leading states has not impelled progress towards a 
universally acceptable definition. Yet, it is precisely this undefined, even indefinable, trait of 
‘terrorism’ - along with its acutely menacing characteristic - that underpins the productive 
and subjectifying capacity of numerous apparatuses of domestic and international 
governance. To begin with, as Jenny Hocking puts it, 
“through its carriage of an implicit yet overwhelming moral illegitimacy, the 
language [of terrorism] itself neatly averts consideration of complex 
questions of causation by assigning an apparently uncontested meaning to 
diverse incidents of political violence. It is a powerful terminology and one 
which allows for the ready adoption of extreme measures that would 
otherwise be strongly resisted.”3 
 
However, despite the abhorrence and fear it knowingly invokes4, the discourse of terrorism 
“constructs no precise criminal act, rendering terrorism of dubious utility as a legal entity.”5 
Notwithstanding this, apart from their condemnatory rhetoric, it is primarily through 
specialist - and usually draconian - legislation that Western states now constitute acts of 
violence as terrorism. In other words, apart from the vocabulary of ‘terrorism’6 it is states’ 
use of anti-terrorism legislation to confront specific acts of violence that serves to define 
these acts as ‘terrorism.’ If a building is torched, the difference between an act of arson and 
an act of terrorism is the legislation under which the perpetrators are charged - more so, even, 
than the rationales put forward by those responsible. 
 
Similarly, armed organisations now become defined as terrorists not just when condemned as 
such by powerful states, but when they are proscribed under anti-terrorism legislation. This is 
especially so when the violence of the organisation in question is not directed at the 
proscribing states or even conducted within their territories. Thus, although proscription is 
effected through the framework of law, it is a patently political act, one moreover which 
decisively moves the organisation and further debates around its stated goals out of the space 
of politics into that of crime and security. Whilst the proscribing state does not have to 
establish the legal case for the ban prior to its enacting, deproscription can only be achieved 
by a successful legal challenge: the burden of proof rests solely with the accused. Notably, 
quite apart from its acts of violence, proscription delegitimises the organisation itself and, 
therefore, its salience to the political arena in which it operates. As Hocking’s observation 
above notes, the language of terrorism effaces the context, such as resistance to state 
oppression or racial persecution, in which non-state violence often takes place. Proscription, 
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moreover, also forecloses or deters further discussion of this effect - outside a legal challenge, 
that is. 
 
The focus of this chapter is, however, not on armed movements themselves, but on how the 
international ‘anti-terrorism’ regime that has emerged over the past two decades enmeshes 
with other domestic apparatuses and discourses in Western liberal states to actively shape the 
behaviour of a range of other, unarmed political actors. In particular, it considers how the 
discourse of terrorism serves to ‘conduct the conduct’7 of actors who are politically active 
within Western liberal democracies, for example in terms of advocacy in connection with 
foreign conflicts, and, by extension, the behaviour of residents, citizen or otherwise, who hail 
originally from these distant places.8 Using the Tamil Diaspora as a case study9, the chapter 
examines how the international anti-terrorism regime, gradually extended since the late 
nineties to include the LTTE10, redefines the field of possibilities for ordinary Tamils vis-à-
vis their struggle against state oppression in Sri Lanka. Although each country’s proscription 
has different legal implications and has been imposed for different stated reasons, 
individually and collectively they serve to criminalize the LTTE and its political project, 
especially amid the explicit criticism of both by the proscribing states. Inevitably this has 
raised serious implications, both within host countries and in Sri Lanka, for the activities, 
political or otherwise, of other Tamil organisations and individuals. The central claim of this 
chapter is that the anti-terrorism regime both directly, by coercively shutting down some 
political spaces, and indirectly, by providing alternative ‘safe’ spaces, shapes Tamil 
expatriates’ political activity in their hostlands towards realising a specific – liberal 
governmental - vision for Sri Lanka.11 Moreover, it is the inherent ambiguity of the notion of 
‘support’ for ‘terrorism’ that allows a raft of governmental techniques and technologies, 
operating alongside the disciplinary framework of anti-terrorism, their purchase on target 
populations within Western liberal states. It is worth noting, moreover, that when enmeshed 
with ruthlessly restrictive asylum and immigration regimes, the anti-terrorism regime also 
shapes the political and other activities of Tamils beyond the hoststate’s borders: ‘supporting’ 
a banned organisation is now sufficient grounds for exclusion.  
As a minimum, the behaviours being compelled from Tamil expatriates include rejection of 
armed struggle and taking up of political struggle in Sri Lanka through non-violent modalities 
- no matter how ineffectual these might actually be in ending state repression. Going further, 
the international anti-terrorism regime also induces other behavioural changes amongst 
politically active Tamils, including refocusing their efforts towards the pursuit of ‘good 
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governance’ rather than ‘self-determination’, a concomitant accordance of primacy to 
‘human’ rather than collective rights and so on. Core issues confronting Tamils in Sri Lanka - 
such as institutionalised ethnic discrimination, embedding of Sinhala majoritarianism within 
the state bureaucracy and military, absence of physical security and protection of law, lack of 
media freedom, etc.12 – thus shift from being justifying elements of their demand for 
independence to being targets for reform of the Sri Lankan state. In other words, rather than 
constituting racist state persecution to be escaped through independent statehood, these 
elements become reconstituted as failures of governance that must be corrected through state 
reform. In short, the international anti-terrorism regime contributes through diffuse, 
peripheral channels towards the transformation of the Tamil liberation struggle into its very 
antithesis: the strengthening, through the logic of ‘reform’, of the hitherto rejected Sri Lankan 
state. This is not to say this radical change has been achieved; indeed this aspect of the global 
liberal project is far from complete and recent developments, including deepening state 
repression in Sri Lanka and the post-proscription evolution of Diaspora strategies, have 
contributed to an intensification of Tamil demands for independence: indeed the increasing 
use of anti-terrorism measures, including force, can be seen as a shift from governmental to 
disciplinary efforts and the exercise of sovereign power. However, an examination of the 
microphysics of the securitisation of politics that the terrorism discourse entails serves to 
illustrate the wider tranformative potency of Western states proscribing a foreign armed 
organisation as terrorists. 
 
Shaping, not curtailing politics 
 
To begin with, contemporary (typically Western-led) international efforts to end intra-state 
conflicts take place in the framework of establishing what Mark Duffield has labelled ‘liberal 
peace’13. These endeavours, increasingly undertaken as part of the wider global liberal project 
by leading Western states and their associated organizations, institutions and agencies, posits 
economic interdependence, democracy and the rule of law as constituting the sustainable 
foundations for world peace.14 As such, liberal peace is ‘irrevocably linked to the territorially 
sovereign state as an umbrella for political community’15 and therefore to its stabilisation and 
strengthening against challenges to its authority, an imperative reflected in contemporary 
anxieties over ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ states (see chapter X).16 Thus, even in the context of 
minority demands for independence from repressive majoritarian states, what is deemed 
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desirable is not the ‘fragmentation’ of the state along ‘ethnic lines’ but rather its 
strengthening and reform in liberal governmental terms i.e. towards a single democratic state 
with strong liberal institutions, a civic polity and an open economy. (Even in the exceptional 
instances where new states have emerged, such as in the former Yugoslavia, this has 
happened through probationary periods of international trusteeship in which, as rites of 
passage, these tenets of liberal peace have to be adopted and ingrained.)17 
 
By the same logic, armed movements, including those fighting for national liberation or self-
determination, are considered, first and foremost, threats to the state that must be compelled 
to disarm and seek remedy for the grievances they claim to represent through non-violent 
means.18 Thus, quite apart from confronting anti-Western violence, it is in the worldwide 
pursuit of liberal peace that the ‘War on Terror’ has became a ‘global’ struggle, drawing 
disparate conflicts in different locations into a single conceptual framework. It is also in this 
context that ‘terrorism’ is no longer a label the Western liberal democracy applies only to 
domestic threats or foreign attackers. In the past such states have been territorially 
conservative when outlawing armed non-state actors, with violence in foreign sites not a 
direct concern except when their own interests and nationals, or perhaps those of close allies, 
were being targeted. The political wings of armed organisations active in other parts of the 
world could therefore function freely alongside other dissidents in the territories of Western 
democracies, often to the chagrin of the states they were opposing. However, this has 
changed markedly in recent times. Western states, as a matter of routine, now not only 
condemn non-state violence in far away places as ‘terrorism’, but also actively respond to it 
at home with crackdowns against the groups held responsible and their supporters. The shift 
is exemplified by a British judge’s 2007 observations while upholding the conviction under 
his country’s terrorism laws of a Libyan dissident accused of supporting violence against the 
Ghaddafi regime: “We can see no reason why,” he asserted, “the citizens of Libya should not 
be protected from such activities by those resident in this country in the same way as the 
inhabitants of Belgium or the Netherlands or the Republic of Ireland.”19 That the regimes 
being confronted by such ‘terrorism’ are also sometimes characterised by the proscribing 
states as repressive or non-democratic is thus irrelevant. So, for that matter, is whether the 
violence is directed at military or civilian targets.20 Thus it is not simply a question of Cold 
War-style solidarity between allied states, but the blanket hostility to non-state violence 
inherent to global liberalism.21 
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Despite acknowledging that the LTTE’s armed struggle for independence is waged solely 
against the Sri Lankan state, most Western states have now proscribed the movement as a 
terrorist group and included it in their domestic anti-terror actions.22 This has taken place, 
notably, amid a growing recognition that the global Tamil Diaspora, numbering over 
800,00023, is a key factor in the Sri Lankan conflict. Tamil expatriates are vocal advocates of 
self-determination and independence, providers of humanitarian relief for the war- and 
tsunami-affected Tamil areas of the island and, in particular, are a source of financial, moral 
and political support for the LTTE.24 The Diaspora has thus increasingly become a key target 
and also a vehicle for global liberal governmental efforts. Although the language of terrorism 
has long been used by international actors in relation to the LTTE,25 now, more so than at any 
time before, the discourse of terrorism has come to mediate the multifaceted relationships 
between expatriate Tamils, their host states and populations, the LTTE and other international 
actors. To examine how the international anti-terrorism regime, encapsulating or permeating 
a range of domestic governmental apparatuses, actively shapes Tamils’ conduct, this chapter 
considers what might otherwise be unremarkable area of activity in the West: advocacy at 
home for political causes abroad. 
 
In keeping with its oft-reiterated ‘with us or against us’ rhetoric, the international anti-
terrorism discourse places political actors – not just armed organisations - into binary 
categories of acceptable and unacceptable. There are gradations within such distributive 
categories26, but the legal act of proscription defines a clear step of exclusion: just as being 
denounced as terrorists is one thing and being banned quite another, being criticised for 
specific ‘extreme’ views is quite different to being prosecuted for ‘supporting’ or ‘glorifying’ 
terrorism. The difference, crucially, depends more on the subjective opinion of the authorities 
than specified or self-evident criteria. It is not simply a question of not being able to express 
support for outlawed violence, say by invoking the principles of self-defence against 
genocide or resistance to state repression. Rather, proscription comes to have a much wider 
impact in the ‘global’ political space that banned armed organisations function within by 
enabling the categorising of political positions or goals as acceptable and unacceptable (using 
the labels of ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’ for example). There is not necessarily an automatic 
mapping: bans of the ‘reprehensible’ LTTE have sometimes been accompanied by assertions 
by the proscribing states that the organisation has ‘legitimate goals’27 (i.e. Tamil 
‘grievances’). However, the international discourse around Sri Lanka has also long held the 
demand for Tamil independent statehood to be ‘extreme’ and that for federalism or autonomy 
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(i.e. accepting Sri Lankan sovereignty) to be a ‘moderate’ position. With the Tamils’ claim of 
the right to self-determination (i.e. that the appropriate form of governance for them is their 
prerogative) remaining unresolved, such international assertions are arbitrary acts of power - 
i.e. of politics - rather than findings of international law. Nonetheless, in the context of 
organisations like the LTTE being proscribed, these assertions, rather than international law, 
come to emphasize the acceptability or otherwise of political stances taken up within Western 
liberal states. For example, an oft-stated assertion by the United States, the first Western state 
to outlaw the LTTE, is that to be deproscribed, the organisation must first renounce violence 
‘in word and deed’ and also give up its goal of an independent Tamil Eelam. Addressing a 
2002 donor conference at which an LTTE delegation was participating as part of the 
Norwegian led peace process, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage stated:  
“Let me leave no doubt: my nation stands firm in the resolve that the 
tactics of terror can never achieve legitimate aspirations. … We urge the 
LTTE … to make it clear to the people of Sri Lanka and indeed to the 
international community that the LTTE has abandoned its armed struggle 
for a separate state; and instead accepts the sovereignty of a Sri Lankan 
government that respects and protects the rights of all its people.” 28 
 
It is this conflation of armed actors’ violence (‘terrorism’) with specific political goals which 
global liberalism finds unacceptable that enables the categorization and sorting of other actors 
who, whilst not involved in armed struggle, are active in the same political space: to demand 
Tamil Eelam is to be deemed sympathetic to the LTTE. Crucially, it is this conflation, more 
than anything else, which enables ‘supporters of terrorism’ to be identified and labelled as 
such. This is not to say that taking up specific political stances will directly result in 
prosecution under anti-terrorism legislation. Rather, it is to suggest that taking up such 
positions is to risk drawing the invasive attention of terrifying and extensive state security 
apparatuses, as well as exclusion and marginalisation from legitimate domestic spaces, such 
as lobbying access to centres of power. This ‘categorical suspicion’29 also paves the way for 
officialdom’s resistance to, if not obstruction of, specific instances of legitimate activity such 
as staging rallies and public meetings, leafleting, public broadcasting, and so on. Inevitably, it 
especially raises serious difficulties for fund raising in support of such political activities. At 
an individual level, it can raise difficulties in travel (e.g. visas and work permits, ‘no-fly’ 
lists, etc), employment (certainly in the military and defence industry, but also in civil service 
or private industry roles where even low levels of security clearance are needed) and so on.  
 
 9 
Thus, it is this implied equivalence of unarmed actors’ political positions to support for the 
violence of ‘like-minded’ armed actors that allows a variety of governmental techniques and 
technologies within Western states their purchase. Moreover, it is amid this implied 
equivalence between specific political positions and support for ‘terrorist’ violence that 
coercive apparatuses enabled by the discourse of (anti-)terrorism come to induce positional 
and behavioural compulsions amongst political actors in the West. In the wake of the 
proscription of an armed organisation, the central question other unarmed actors come to face 
is how to engage in politics without incurring the ostracising and manifestly dangerous label 
of ‘supporters of terrorism.’ At a basic level, if they are to safely pursue their political goals, 
they must adopt specific behaviours including discernibly distancing themselves from, even 
condemning, the ‘terrorists’ fighting for these goals. As in the case of the Tamils, the 
implications for a people remaining united while seeking national liberation from racial 
oppression are obvious. Moreover, by enacting legislation that threatens severe punishment 
for ‘supporting’ terrorism, the terms of what does and doesn’t constitute acceptable advocacy 
are also set. For example, if a proscribed organisation enters into negotiations with its state 
adversary, how can its stances on the issues under negotiation be endorsed by other Tamil 
actors – especially if the proscribing state strongly opposes these positions? If the 
organisation breaks off peace talks and resumes its military campaign citing reasons (say 
non-implementation of agreements already reached or continuing state violence) that host 
states deem unacceptable, what are the consequences of echoing these reasons? As noted 
above, it is not a question of whether a particular viewpoint has merit or not in itself, but 
whether it is possible to articulate it without fear of being punished for supporting the 
violence (i.e. terrorism) of armed actors also holding these views. The range of advocatable 
positions available to unarmed political actors thus narrows and is sometimes closed off 
altogether by the outlawing of other armed actors. 
 
Crucially, the anti-terrorism regime’s coercive effects not only close off some spaces, but 
also promote other, more preferable, political positions. Just as it discourages certain 
behaviours, such as advocacy of anti-state violence and the championing of ‘extreme’ 
positions (such as independence), it also encourages the taking up of other, more ‘moderate’ 
positions. Thus it is not simply a question of silencing or curtailing debate, but the more 
productive effect of shaping and directing its terms. With its punitive apparatuses poised over 
some spaces and withheld from others, the international anti-terrorism regime promotes the 
articulation and adoption by the target population of a range of liberal governmental 
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positions. At a basic level these include, as noted above, rejection of armed struggle and the 
adoption of non-violent methods. However, as in the case of Tamil expatriates, the regime 
goes much further, for example encouraging the politicisation of what are deemed ‘inclusive’ 
rather than ‘exclusive’ identities – e.g. adoption of a ‘civic’ (Sri Lankan), as opposed to 
‘ethnic’ (Tamil) one, accordance of primacy to human, rather than collective, rights and so 
on. In short, by setting out what are ‘moderate’ and ‘extreme’ views and simultaneously 
wielding the punitive apparatuses enabled by proscription, the international anti-terrorism 
regime constitutes the disciplinary and sovereign framework required for the expansion of 
liberal governmentality. 
 
Disciplining the diaspora  
 
This illiberal aspect of the anti-terrorism regime is no longer disguised, as exemplified by the 
harsh penalties dealt out in Britain for those held to be ‘encouraging’ or ‘glorifying’ 
terrorism.30 This might, at a first glance, seem a contradiction to the notion that the regime 
seeks to promote liberal values abroad. However this inconsistency fades when considered in 
the context of the global liberal project which posits these ‘universal’ values as an unalloyed 
(and thus incontestable) ultimate good, in the interests of which extreme, patently illiberal 
measures, including massive military violence, are justified.31 Terrorism proscriptions enable 
a domestic disciplinary framework, one based on apparatuses of coercion, surveillance and, 
as discussed below, behavioural training, that seeks to actively produce well behaved citizens 
of liberal governmentality. As proscription is primarily a legal sanction, the coercion is 
underwritten by poised state machinery: police and other internal security forces, prisons, 
deportations, individual sanctions (including restrictions on travel, employment, access to 
welfare, etc.) and so on. Beyond these, the much publicised practices of ‘rendition’ and other 
extra-judicial aspects of the ‘global’ anti-terrorism architecture (including the sharing of 
‘terrorism intelligence’ with other states) are amongst the fearsome consequences of crossing 
the indiscernible and ever shifting line of ‘supporting terrorism’ whilst living in the West. 
Thus the disciplinary framework is closely linked not just to governmentality but also to 
sovereign power. 
 
Terrorism-related surveillance begins with the overt deployment of state apparatus, including 
the police, intelligence services and other regulatory structures. Public rallies and 
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demonstrations often require police approval, which is frequently not forthcoming for events 
organised by pro-Eelam Tamil actors but is easier for ‘moderate’ actors to obtain. Even when 
approved, events are increasingly subjected to overt monitoring, with grim-faced uniformed 
police photographing and videotaping those attending as well as those on stage. In the context 
of manifest Western, opposition to the Tamil Eelam project, such menacing security presence 
inevitably induces a high degree of self-regulation amongst both speakers and attendees, as 
well as a reluctance to participate in some events. Slogans and placards must be careful to 
avoid being seen as supporting (or in the UK, ‘glorifying’) terrorism. Speeches must also 
remain within these unspecified limits, which, as noted above, are more subjective 
assessments by authorities than clearly defined parameters. The text of leaflets, publications 
and even Internet websites must be ‘self’-regulated in the same manner, as must reporting 
and commentary by Tamil expatriate media.32 
In addition to this formal oversight is the state’s surveillance ‘at a distance’ i.e. its efforts to 
co-opt the citizenry as part of its terrorism-related scrutiny. Public advertisements – posters, 
radio broadcasts, etc exhorting citizens to ‘report anything suspicious’ (and encouraging them 
to err on the side of caution) heighten the gap between those clearly unproblematic citizens 
and those who might be supporters of terrorism. For example, an advertisement by the British 
police in a London newspaper urged the city’s residents: “Terrorism – if you suspect it, report 
it.”33 Listing the number of a ‘confidential, anti-terrorist hotline’, it goes on to list what might 
be suspect, including: “Terrorists use computers; do you know someone who visits terrorist-
related websites? Terrorists need to travel; Meetings can take place anywhere. Do you know 
someone who travels but is vague about where they are going? Terrorists need transport: if 
you work in vehicle hire or sales, has a sale or rental made you suspicious?”34 
 
Thus, whilst proscription might be a legal matter, accusations of supporting or assisting 
terrorists can easily be levelled in fora other than the courts. Indeed, anonymous accusations 
by anyone (and anywhere) are positively encouraged. The government of Sri Lanka or one of 
its departments, such as the local embassy, hostile media (local or foreign, including Sri 
Lankan), political, business or personal rivals, and otherwise disgruntled individuals, etc. can 
level accusations, no matter how unsubstantiated, against Tamil organisations and 
individuals. Such dynamics and their consequences have been explored in the extensive 
literature that comprises surveillance studies35 and in studies of welfare regimes.36 Notably, 
there is usually little or no risk of penalty to false accusers. It is often impossible to trace the 
pointing finger that triggers invasive probes into political activities and, indeed, personal 
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lives. Even if accusers are identified, given the opaqueness of the reporting mechanisms, 
there is no redress save that offered by difficult and probably expensive libel claims. The 
proscribing state may choose not to or may not have the resources to monitor every broadcast 
or article by every media outlet, scrutinise every publication by every organisation, or listen 
to every speech. But anyone who suspects or claims a breach of anti-terrorist legislation can 
alert the authorities, even anonymously, without fear of repercussion. Expatriate Tamil 
electronic media, for example, routinely have to cooperate with regulators following up 
spurious claims filed anonymously that their broadcasts have supported the LTTE or its 
violence.37 
 
That this ‘surveillance at a distance’ is an integral part of the proscription regime was 
underlined by Canada’s government in April 2006. Announcing his country’s ban on the 
LTTE, Public Safety Minister Stockwell Day also unveiled an advertising campaign directed 
at local Tamils to ‘explain’ the terrorist designation: “in one of the ads that we're putting out 
there's a number listed for people who are emboldened now by the [ban] and may want to 
contact authorities for follow up.”38 He added: “authorities will be keeping a close eye on 
affiliated organizations that could run afoul of the terrorist designation should they continue 
allying themselves with the [LTTE].”39 The immediate question for Tamil political actors is 
what constitutes the threatening characterisation of an ‘affiliated organisation.’ More 
importantly, in the context of taking up political positions in Canada, is what exactly ‘allying’ 
themselves with the LTTE might mean – although the obvious inference, of course, being 
support for Tamil Eelam. 
 
At other times, peaceful Tamil political activity characterized in this way has fallen more 
directly within the ambit of the legal system. Two of the organizers of a Tamil expatriate 
rally in London’s Hyde Park on July 25 2006 marking the anniversary of the July 1983 anti-
Tamil pogrom in Sri Lanka (an event that was attended by some 15, 000 people – see figure 
2) [INSERT FIGURE TWO ABOUT HERE] were subsequently arrested (exactly a year 
later) and charged under the Terrorism Act 2006 with organizing an event in support of a 
banned terrorist organization. Whilst the organisers had been granted permission for the event 
and police were also in attendance, the investigation into ‘supporting terrorism’ was initiated 
by complaints from the Sri Lankan High Commission in London.40 
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Figure 2: Tamil expatriate rally in Hyde Park, London, 25 July 2006. Photograph by Suthaharan 
Nadarajah 
 
Moreover, the ambiguity around what constitutes ‘support for terrorism’ and individuals’ fear 
of the consequences of falling foul of anti-terrorism laws also paves the way for state action 
outside the courts. Proscriptions of the LTTE have enabled state intervention in Tamil 
expatriate political and social activity even when no crime is being committed. This is 
exemplified by similar developments in the Canada, UK, and Europe whereby, after 
proscriptions of the LTTE (and in Australia, where a fundraising ban was imposed in 2002), 
security forces have sought to discourage and undermine social and political events organised 
by pro-Eelam Tamils while leaving unfettered those of actors who either oppose or distance 
themselves from the LTTE and its political project (it is worth noting here how the lobbying 
against the LTTE cannot be countered without immediately falling foul of laws outlawing 
‘support for terrorism’). Police tactics include, for example, privately encouraging, even 
pressuring, the owners of halls, sports fields and other venues to refuse to hire their sites to 
pro-independence Tamil organisations. 
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Such state interventions frequently turn directly on the dissembling logic of the possibility of 
the customer being a ‘terrorist front’ intending to raise funds through the event. In some 
cases, venues have admitted to long-standing customers they were now turning away, to 
having been influenced by suggestions by police that they (venues) might become complicit 
in fund raising for the LTTE. Even when customers point out that their books are audited by 
the Inland Revenue service and no wrongdoing has been found, many venues are reluctant to 
take the risk. Indeed, when suggestions of ‘supporting’ or financing terrorism are raised 
through such ‘unofficial’ channels, the event organisers are, inevitably, the least able to 
reassure venues of their bona fides. The unspecified ‘security concerns’ that some venues 
have cited for rejecting Tamil business emerge from the context in which as yet unproven 
claims of ‘links’ to terrorism can be unproblematically raised - even as a mere possibility - by 
either the security forces or a range of anti-LTTE campaigners, including the local Sri 
Lankan embassy, who bombard potential venues with accusations of imminent complicity in 
‘supporting terrorism.’ In some cases, the venues’ consequent response has been to urge such 
problematic customers to bring explicit endorsements from the police – who are, of course, 
under no obligation to provide these. When approached, police simply advise the event 
organisers that there are no security concerns about them and that they should appraise the 
venues thus. Moreover, implicitly and sometimes explicitly, the organisers’ political 
positions are acknowledged as the underlying reasons for the difficult situation they find 
themselves in with the attendant encouragement to retreat from stances that are problematic 
(see discussion on advocacy below). 
 
At the same time, notably, there is no official bar on any of the events themselves  -except 
when permission for rallies or marches are refused, often without explanations having to be 
offered. Neither are the organisers themselves proscribed or officially blacklisted. By simply 
raising the spectre of ‘supporting terrorism’, Tamil organisations can be subject (perhaps 
even unintentionally on the part of venues) to a subtle array of discriminatory practices. 
Under other, ‘normal’, circumstances, venues are under no compulsion to reject customers on 
the basis of third-party allegations of impending criminality; indeed for venues to turn away 
Tamil or other minority customers on such claims is to risk being sued for racial 
discrimination. However, in the context of ‘supporting terrorism’, not only are venue owners 
able to reject custom, they are expected to. More generally, the populations affected by these 
proscription-related difficulties are invariably minorities, including Tamils, Kurds, Muslims 
and so on. In short, the anti-terrorism discourse can thus be seen to facilitate the wholesale 
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discarding of the anti-racism and anti-discriminatory safeguards normally applicable to 
minorities in Western states. 
Learning to speak: political advocacy 
 
The impossibility of expressing political support for the LTTE has to be considered in the 
context of many Tamils seeing the viability of their liberation struggle as linked to the 
‘success’, broadly defined, of the LTTE in resisting and challenging the Sri Lankan state. 
Having emerged in the eighties as the dominant Tamil protagonist in the conflict following a 
number of early confrontations within the broader Tamil resistance movement, the LTTE has 
since developed both a conventional military force and a substantial civil administrative 
apparatus comprising a de-facto state41 in those areas it has established control over. It is the 
largest and most prominent actor advocating the cause of Tamil self-determination and has 
been the Sri Lankan government’s sole interlocutor in four of the five peace processes (it was 
part of coalition of four militant groups in the first) since the conflict began in the early 
eighties.42 However, Tamils in the West cannot explicitly endorse the proscribed LTTE as 
representatives of the Tamil polity in negotiations or other spaces, both for fear of falling foul 
of domestic law and, amid the “implicit yet overwhelming moral illegitimacy” of terrorism,43 
to avoid their advocacy efforts being dismissed out of hand as ‘extremism’ or ‘support for 
terrorism’. It is amid this dynamic of having to avoid political irrelevancy whilst lobbying for 
the Tamil cause that the productive effect of the anti-terrorism regime turns: it is not only a 
question of self-censorship, but also the specific political positions that come to be taken up. 
This is not to say these constitute deep felt ideological shifts – all too often they do not. 
Rather, the focus here is how changes in Tamil actors’ conduct come to propagate values and 
positions in keeping with liberal governmentality and write out those linked with national 
self-determination. There are two separate aspects of this induced shift discussed here: firstly, 
not positing the LTTE as the Tamil leadership that the international community and Sri 
Lankan state must deal with, and, secondly, reconstituting the specific political terms in 
which Tamil grievances are framed. 
 
Prior to the proscriptions of the LTTE, a central plank of political activity by pro-
independence Tamils in the West has been to endorse and promote the LTTE as the ‘sole’ or 
‘authentic’ representatives of the Tamil people vis-à-vis resolving Sri Lanka’s ethnic 
question. Especially since the advent of the Norwegian peace process in 2001, Tamil 
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petitions, appeals and messages at mass rallies prior to the proscriptions have reiterated this 
position, while the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), a coalition of Sri Lanka’s four main 
Tamil parties, put this at the core of its manifesto for the 2004 elections in which it swept the 
Tamil areas. At the height of the Norwegian-led peace process, in 2003 and 2004, a series of 
mass rallies – titled ‘Pongu Thamil’ (Tamil Upsurge) - in every major Tamil population 
centre in Sri Lanka’s Northeast and in Diaspora locations endorsed this ‘sole representatives’ 
demand. However, the international proscriptions of the LTTE either outlawed further 
articulation of this stand or where it did not, as in the US (where the right to freedom of 
speech is, in principle, not trumped by terrorism laws), created a political climate in which 
was extremely awkward, if not dangerous, to do so. This is a crucial constraint in the Tamil 
liberation project: it is not simply a question of not being able to advocate armed struggle 
(‘terrorism’) against state repression, but also of not being able to promote the LTTE as the 
Tamils’ political leadership even when negotiating a political solution. The point here is not 
whether the ‘sole representative’ claim is reasonable or not on its own terms, but whether it is 
legally possible to endorse it. This separation of ‘Tamil grievances’ from the LTTE is a key 
axiom of the global liberal order’s approach to Sri Lanka’s conflict. Despite the previous 
years of mass rallies, petitions and other articulations by European Tamils endorsing the 
LTTE as the Tamils’ political representatives, the EU insisted, whilst banning the LTTE in 
2006: “[this] decision is directed at the LTTE, and not at the Tamil people.”44 Getting the 
Tamils to reject the LTTE as their political leadership and distance their political project from 
its armed struggle has long been an international objective, illustrated by the Australian 
government’s declaration in November 1996 that it would only meet with Tamil groups 
“provided they condemn in writing the terrorist activities of the LTTE.”45 The proscriptions 
of the LTTE simply turn this preference into a legally enforceable requirement. 
 
The (West-led) international community has thus, whilst demanding that Tamils reject the 
LTTE, assumed for itself the role of championing Tamils’ rights vis-à-vis the Sri Lankan 
state (which it is also supporting against the LTTE). This self-nomination is also integral to 
the global liberal project, exemplified today by the logics of ‘humanitarian intervention’, 
‘responsibility to protect’ and ‘human security’.46 The appropriate response for persecuted 
peoples is therefore not to take up arms against their state oppressors, but to call on the 
cavalry of the global liberal order for rescue. Thus, it is global liberalism’s characterisation of 
what constitutes the failings of the Sri Lanka state, rather than the Tamils’ own, that comes to 
define the political terrain in which Tamil political activity can take place. Global liberalism 
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defines the problem in Sri Lanka as ‘a crisis of the state’, of failures to meet international 
standards of governance, of institutional weakness, etc.47 Tamils also point to these, but 
argue, crucially, that these stem from the Sinhala-dominated state’s institutional 
(constitutional, procedural and ideological) and thus insurmountable racism. Moreover, the 
Tamil solution is to exercise their right to self-determination; i.e. not to pursue reform of the 
majoritarian state, but to form a state of their own.48 The foundation for the latter is a 
narrative that posits Tamils and Sinhalese as distinct nations, entitled to self-rule in their 
respective homelands in the Northeast and South of the island. Thus, even when the 
‘solution’ is framed in terms of ‘autonomy’ (rather than independence), the Tamil vision is 
very different to that of liberal peace. The former is based on recognition of the two nations 
and homelands and thus on sharing of power between them. However, the latter envisages a 
transformation of the present Sri Lankan state into a better governance structure, one 
explicitly privileging liberal and neo-liberal values, rather than ‘particularist’ ones. Tamils 
may have ‘legitimate grievances’, but these must be addressed within a single, democratic, 
multi-ethnic space with no room for ethnic homelands. The individual (Sri Lankan citizen), 
rather than the (Tamil or Sinhala) nation, must thus be the unit and object of governance. 
With individual (‘human’) rights, rather than collective rights, thus coming to the fore, 
resolution of Sri Lanka’s crisis is seen to turn primarily on ensuring of rule of law and 
equitable development (i.e. on ensuring economic opportunities for all individuals) rather 
than on recognising the Tamils, as they demand, as a nation - i.e. with collective and 
territorially grounded political rights - that requires protection from state repression. The need 
for ‘autonomy’ (say federalism) or ‘devolution’ is accepted, but only because it furthers the 
economic and political decentralisation of the state required by liberal peace; there is, 
however, no room for recognition of ‘ethnic homelands’49. 
 
As the proscriptions of the LTTE have gradually extended across Western states, Tamil 
political activity in these countries has gradually come to focus less on endorsement of the 
LTTE as the Tamil leadership and more on abstract demands for ‘peace talks’ or ‘a 
negotiated solution’ involving the LTTE – a stance, on the face of it, not dissimilar to that of 
the international community. Similarly, Tamil advocacy increasingly turns less on the 
concepts of homeland, nationhood and self-determination, although these continue to inform 
Tamil politics, and more on specific failings - in liberal governmental terms, that is - of the 
Sri Lankan state’s governance, including human rights abuses, inequitable allocation of state 
resources, crushing of media freedom, etc. For example, the killings in recent years by 
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suspected security forces personnel or Army-backed paramilitaries of Tamil parliamentarians, 
journalists and political activists are constituted not as part of the state’s efforts to crush the 
Tamil liberation project, but of the government’s silencing of ‘critics’. The Sri Lankan state’s 
privileging of the Sinhala-dominated South and its exclusion of the Tamil-dominated 
Northeast in the allocation of international post-tsunami assistance50 to Sri Lanka becomes 
‘inequitable’ distribution, of inefficiency with ethnic overtones, rather than the wilful neglect 
of the non-Sinhala regions.51 
 
Moreover, Tamil advocacy has increasingly come to demand the international community 
address these failings of liberal governance rather than to recognise state racism and the 
Tamil claim to self-determination. These elements are exemplified by the conduct of the 
Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC), a prominent Diaspora lobby group known earlier for its 
advocacy for international recognition of the Tamil struggle for self-determination and of the 
LTTE.52 Three months after Canada’s 2006 ban on the LTTE, the CTC petitioned the 
government to “appoint a neutral human-rights observer … to document abuses on all sides 
[and] throughout Sri Lanka.”53 The CTC also called on the Canadian government to “appoint 
an impartial body to track aid flow into Sri Lanka to ensure it is equitably distributed.”54 The 
CTC’s efforts to avoid its earlier ‘Tamil liberation’ position hinges on its calls now for 
‘neutral’ and ‘impartial’ intervention by Canada, rather than in support of the Tamils’ 
struggle against oppression. Human rights abuses, rather than persecution of the Tamil 
nation, are posited as the problem for the Canadian government to address. The concern with 
abuses ‘on all sides’ and ‘throughout Sri Lanka’ fits with commonly stated international 
characterisations of the Sri Lankan crisis (i.e. not of state persecution and consequent 
liberation struggle, but of a lack of rule of law and good governance) and of the international 
community (as concerned primarily with the welfare of Sri Lanka’s residents, rather than 
self-interested support for the state). 
The point here is the CTC is still seeking to promote the Tamil cause, but feels it cannot only 
argue, as it has done in the past, that in the context of the Sri Lankan state repression, Canada 
must support Tamil independence. To be seen as ‘reasonable’ or ‘moderate’ and not be 
dismissed (or worse, investigated) as ‘LTTE-supporters’, the CTC situates itself some 
distance from its earlier position of categorically demanding Tamil Eelam alongside the 
LTTE (which it now refers to as the present ‘governing authority’ – rather than 
‘representatives’ - of the Tamils of Sri Lanka55). The CTC thus comes to echo the 
international discourse that posits both the LTTE and the Sri Lanka state as problematic. The 
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CTC also seeks an agreeably reasonable ‘impartial monitoring’ of aid flow as opposed to an 
earlier stance by Tamil expatriates that the international community must support a joint aid-
sharing mechanism between the LTTE and GoSL. The inadvertent shift here accepts that the 
LTTE, like the GoSL, cannot be trusted with international aid - whereas a joint mechanism 
equates the legitimacy of both sides, impartial monitoring equates their illegitimacy. 
Furthermore the CTC’s appeal now posits the Canadian government and the international 
community as the custodians of Tamil interests, rather than the LTTE or the Tamils 
themselves. 
Conclusion 
 
The central claim of this chapter has been that, by coercively shutting down specific political 
spaces and by providing alternative ‘safe’ spaces, the international anti-terrorism regime 
seeks to shape the Tamil Diaspora’s political activity in their hostlands towards realising a 
liberal governmental vision for Sri Lanka. The point here is not that Tamil self-imagination 
as a persecuted people or an oppressed nation will be abandoned simply because the global 
liberal order wills it so. Rather, it is to argue that Tamils’ political agitations increasingly 
come to take place in ways that reinforce the liberal order’s problem-definition of Sri Lanka 
(i.e. a failure of governance requiring state reform), rather than reflect the Tamils’ own sense 
of an oppressed nation seeking to exercise their right to self-determination.  
 
The global liberal order has reconstituted the core issues confronting Sri Lanka’s Tamils - 
such as institutionalised discrimination, embedding of Sinhala majoritarianism within the 
state bureaucracy and military, absence of physical security and rule of law, lack of media 
freedom, etc. – from being justifying elements of a demand for independence into targets of 
reform of the Sri Lankan state. These behavioural shifts are pursued on the basis of an 
asserted and implied conflation between the articulation of certain political positions (such as 
the demand for Tamil independence) and support for ‘terrorist’ violence (the LTTE’s armed 
struggle). By setting out what are ‘moderate’ and ‘extreme’ views and simultaneously 
wielding the punitive apparatuses enabled by terrorism proscription, the global liberal order 
seeks to set the terms of what does and does not constitute acceptable advocacy. 
 
This is not to say this sought after transformation of the Tamil liberation project has been 
achieved. Indeed, despite the increasing deployment of coercive anti-terrorism measures 
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within Western states, expatriate Tamils continue to pursue their cause of national liberation 
from Sri Lankan state oppression in a variety of ways. However, amid the global liberal 
order’s robust backing for the Sri Lankan state in confronting the LTTE, they are compelled 
to do so with considerable care and guile to avoid the terrifying apparatuses of domestic 
security enabled by anti-terrorism legislation. Interestingly, in recent years, the Tamil 
liberation project has been increasingly reinforced by the Sri Lankan state’s own deepening 
resistance to the global liberal order. The strident Sinhala nationalism and chauvinism that 
has engulfed the Sri Lankan state and polity since 2004, particularly as the internationally-
backed military campaign against the LTTE has gained ground,56 has made international 
assertions of the reformability of the Sri Lankan state along liberal lines increasingly 
untenable. Indeed, it is amid a manifest inability or unwillingness of the global liberal order 
to discipline and transform the Sri Lankan state that the call for an independent Tamil Eelam 
has emerged forcefully again at the centre of Tamil expatriate agitation. Notably, however, 
even this long-standing goal of independence is now pursued by mobilising the referential 
terms of liberal governmentality alongside, if not ahead of, the foundations of nation, 
homeland and self-determination that formed the basis for it before. To say that terrorism 
proscription has thus far failed to transform the Tamil liberation project into one of liberal 
state-building in Sri Lanka is not, therefore, to deny the potency of the securitisation of 
politics that the terrorism discourse constitutes. 
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